Abstract
S tating the problem
The political process in South Africa today is dominated by liberal pluralist thinking. South African liberal pluralism, however, assum es Euro-American value terms and working conditions which, as liberal procedures standardly do, tend to screen out the diversity o f cultural viewpoints and conflicts, thus prejudicing the South African political culture to a politics o f difference, the very thing which a multicultural reality seeks to affirm. It is a striking irony that the categories o f difference (and identity) which the apartheid era had so prejudicially affirmed in favour o f whites, particularly with respect to citizenship (and, by implication, negated for blacks) once again disappears under the weight of political expediency. This is a different form o f what, during the apartheid era, might have been called an " uneven deployment o f identity politics" (Goldberg, 1994:110) . A number o f identity struggles arising from notions o f difference are challenging the established norms o f liberalism's attempt to foster a single political culture. This challenge is really about unrecognized assumptions in the liberal programme about how a multicultural civil society operates, a reminder that the discursive space within which a multicultural critique might grow has to be recognized as part o f the social conditions o f a dem ocratic culture.
The culturalism o f modernity relies on a civil-society tradition, one which includes the practice o f contested dialogues as the main mechanism through which political disputes are settled. The growth o f this tradition in South Africa since the demise o f apartheid has been characterized by the difference-blind fashion in which liberalism standardly treats certain items on the agenda o f the public dialogue. This means that the notion o f a contested dialogue has operated only within a space constrained by the things which are excluded -things like the impact o f culture and ethnicity on the process o f nation building. These things would -if recognized -transform the civil society matrix to reflect a politics o f difference centred in civil groupings seeking identity through self-definition in the political institutions made available by the liberal constitution.
The politicization o f the public sphere and o f the critical discourse which has recently grown in this arena is, o f course, an ideal o f pluralist programmes; this is to protect a multiplicity o f cultural spaces from the pow er o f the state and from assimilation by dominant cultures. But politicization o f the public dialogue in South Africa has thus far proceeded without any significant attem pt to contextualize the debate in cultural and ethnic realities, though the nation-building rhetoric currently in vogue has strong nationalist overtones. This smacks o f ideological orthodoxy (no doubt a consequence o f apartheid's painful legacy), and is self-defeating in two important senses: it tends to blur the distinction between state and civil society (another irony, for the failure to m ake the distinction was part and parcel o f the apartheid regim e's ideological com mit ments), and it blunts the edge o f critical theory -an edge which, in G oldberg's turn o f phrase " ... depends on the national and institutional sites that constitute the horizons o f practice ... [M] ulti-cultural linkage o f criticism requires comparative contextualization ... [i.e.] sources in multiple cultural contexts so that the critical tools used as a w edge into understanding the production o f norms themselves would become objects o f scrutiny" (Goldberg, 1994:120) .
The dependence on culture as a context for criticism should itself always be the subject o f critical inquiry, for this guards against forgetfulness about how Western pluralist concepts are received and read in African contexts. A critical multiculturalism necessarily seeks " alliances o f differently contextualized critique" (Goldberg, 1994:121) as a bulwark against assimilation o f differences by liberal cultures and the marginalizing effects o f this process (the consequences o f liberalisms' failure to acknowledge culture and ethnicity as epistemically viable categories o f difference). The critical import o f such alliances is manifested in the challenge offered to the alleged universals o f liberalism 's discourses, particularly those advocating tolerance (o f differences) and em pathy (for minorities), founded on a concept o f a common humanity.
Goldberg's point about the treatment o f difference in "com parative contextualization" can be made as a question about the starting and endpoints of critique. One must " start from local critiques and then derive a larger picture o f what critique would mean when articulated from different positions" (Goldberg, 1994:123) .
The recognition that cultural differences are a source o f critical force is really only useful if the public sphere is truly an unconstrained space, one in which a variety o f identity struggles can be brought into "comparative relation" (Goldberg, 1994:124) without the threat o f assimilation and marginalization. In this context the critical force o f the notion o f difference retains its edge, which is easily lost when culture is understood as a site o f shared or common understandings, a point which the "nation building"-rhetoric in South Africa exploits. The notion o f a critical edge which a comparative relation o f alternative points o f view makes possible is captured in the idea that " ... different cultures ... have quite different uses for the same theory -or the same history" (Goldberg, 1994:121) .
It is possible to argue that from non-colonial perspectives o f otherness, the history o f South Africa could be put to a variety o f critical uses, one o f which would be the creation o f non-colonial spaces for an encounter with liberal histories. Such an encounter would impart a critical edge to the notion o f difference, one which could lend epistemic credibility to the otherness o f alternative viewpoints. The critical potential o f an encounter between the different histories o f South Africa lies in the fact that they make available perspectives o f otherness. Liberal histories (for example The O xford history o f South Africa edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson) bear witness to anthropological categories o f cultural difference (the influence, no doubt, o f M alinowski and other structuralists), articulated as local, community-based "native" perspectives, written from the viewpoint o f liberal individualism. This viewpoint, however, blocks from view the very political conditions needed to account for the existence o f " native" perspectives, conditions which non-colonial histories would be able to exploit as critical tools to rescue the " identity" o f the post-colonial subject from essentialism, to show that these subjects are time-bound social/historical constructions and to critique them and their "native" predecessors as such. Given G oldberg's "com parative" approach such an encounter would amount to a deconstruction o f time-bound social and cultural constructions -a levelling o f the playingfield for both " natives" and "colonists" .
The anthropological categories o f cultural difference which existed within the framework o f liberalism aided a discourse o f domination during the colonial epoch.
In South Africa today liberalism continues to dominate through its assimilationist mode o f operation. The way in which liberalism recognizes " difference" brackets all that forms part o f the substantive social life of individuals: assimilation operates through the non-recognition o f the O ther in her historical or cultural setting. Civic community is conceived homogenously and monoculturally in the interests o f fostering the "one-nation-one-people-one culture" idea o f democracy. In this sense liberalism is a reactionary force.
The culturalism o f modernity ceases to be culture if civic communities can be admitted to civil life only in some trunctuated form, stripped o f the particularity o f their historical and cultural settings which give substance to their social identities. Trunctuation creates problems o f self-understanding and self-definition in political life, the very context through whose agency these things are actualized.
The political incom petence o f the culturalism o f m odernity

The discourse theory of culture
Habermas's comments on culture form part o f his attem pts to work out a critical theory o f society. The main theme o f H aberm as's involvement with culture appears as a critique o f capitalism. Pusey (1987:199) describes it as "an attempt to recover from the system o f exploitation inherent in capitalist production a potential for rational reconstruction and development o f society, which reconstruction would, because o f the stress on reason, have em ancipatory potential for society".
Reason and emancipation
Haberm as's involvement with reason is the foundation on which he constructs a theory o f culture. Habermas is intent on uncovering ideologies which inform a community's self-understanding and linking them to forms o f culture which have potential for emancipation. This, in effect, is a quest for the rational em ancipation from ideologies which encourage domination and submission as the pattern or governing principle o f interaction in society (Pusey, 1987:194-209) .
How does Habermas conceive o f reason's em ancipatory function? Briefly, like Marx, Habermas believes that the capitalist mode o f production harbour on elitist ideology which, in effect, manipulates both majoritarian and consensual (pluralistic) forms o f democracy. M arket relations between w age-labour and capital form the basis o f exploitation and domination, which is made possible by a social organization geared to the demands o f capital accumulation. Capital accumulation as a structuring or governing principle o f society has to be replaced by a different principle o f social organization, one geared rationally to the satisfaction o f human needs as the primary objective. A labour theory o f culture, o f the kind Marx produced, cannot provide the desired principle. The reason is that Marx reduces all patterns o f social interaction to labour. This kind o f (economic) reductionism identifies social integration (the process o f socialization) too closely with production, technology and instrumental (technical) knowledgea focus too narrow for Habermas. For Habermas socialization and production are distinct processes, and though both have a place in H aberm as's social order, only socialization properly admits o f rational justificatory procedures which create the kind o f socio-cultural structures that have emancipatory potential (Sensat, 1979:55-77) . Following Sensat (1979) this thesis distinguishes between normative structures that link in a M arxist way to economic systems, and normative structures that connect, in the way Habermas wants, with the "cultural" -a Lebenswelt which reason might shape in accordance with human needs.
Normative structures linking with economic systems are external to the individual -a self-contained lifeworld which can be separated from individual consciousness. Normative structures linking with culture are internal to the individual, in the sense that those structures make up a lifeworld out o f which the individual cannot step. This separation gives to reason considerable pow er to generate a critique o f society, in particular, a critique o f exploitive economic systems like capitalism. This separation also allows Habermas to separate notions o f autonomy and identity from a determinist basis in economics, in a way in which M arx could not. But, though normative structures are separated, they remain tied to each other: the normative structures o f culture are " superstructural" (Pusey, 1987:198) , and this means that culture is a superstructural phenomenon, resting on the normative structures o f socio-economic systems. So H aberm as's separation is not complete -economic structures condition cultural structures, though they are not the only factors at play; rational justifications o f normative structures and rationally secured social agreements are as important. Culture has to be understood as rational social action -it is a rational form o f com municative action. The idea o f culture understood as communicative action is very simpleculture is something subjects or agents create, in thought and deed with the help o f reason, guided by the normative structures o f particular socio-economic systems.
It is apparent from what has been said that Haberm as gives considerable normative force to rationality. Rationality is understood not only as purposive or instrumental -as having structure-forming pow er in so far as it creates cultural structures. It also has intrinsic value understood as em ancipatory potential, which is value in itself. In this regard rationality mediates all social relations, and to do this it must necessarily be em bedded in the common or shared understandings of a community, as contained in its various self-understandings. Thus understood rationality is " linguistically mediated social interaction" (Pusey, 1987:199) , which includes a critical component: a pow er to restructure society along rationally agreed lines. This critical component is its " emancipatory potential" (Pusey, 1987:199) . This is just rationality understood as a property o f human thought and language -a quality directed to asking and answering questions about human needs and the social conditions required for their fulfilment.
History, reason and legitimacy
The public and private spheres
The rise o f the modem era was marked by the following:
• the separation between the "public" and "private" spheres (or between "civil" and "civic" society),
• the development in society o f the idea o f agency rights, and
• finally the development o f the idea o f a public forum o f discourse (or public discursive space) which served as the arena within which opposing moral and political views could be debated.
It is possible for societies to particularize by making use o f a range o f informal interpersonal practices, created through conflict between the needs o f agents to pursue local goals and a communual need for basic collective solidarity1. Individuated public spaces -whether individuated through commerce, science, religion etc. -form civic societies; collectively they form civil society. Civic society permits the growth o f various solidarities among interest groups, usually in opposition to the established civil authority. Civil society is best understood as an institutionalized correlate o f the political authority, and cannot be defined in terms which express opposition to the state. Civic society, by contrast, is a form o f social organization em bedded within civil society acting as a countervailing force to civil society.
Civic society becom es the arena in which the values o f various interest groups are confirmed. Since civic society is managed by interest groups, the public spaces generated are small enough to permit social meanings and their interpretations to be contested and rewritten. Autonomy is protected by the fact that the boundary between civic and civil society creates a legitim ate private realm, which, by virtue o f its oppositional nature, could engage in critical dialogue with the public (civil) realm.
Generating consensus or agreement through the contested dialogue o f a public debate has a significant spin-off. Thus conceptions o f the good life are privatized (within a civic grouping) before being pushed out onto the agenda o f the public dialogue, where they compete for legitimation. No belief to which anyone may 1 For my understanding of the "private-public" distinction 1 am indebted to Buchowski (1979) be deeply committed -such as the belief that a sexual division o f labour is morally wrong because it oppresses women and hinder their attainment o f personhood can be excluded, and so no-one is prevented from seeking the w idest possible forum to arrive at a consensus. The contested dialogue o f a public debate renegotiates and redefines the boundary between "private" and "public", since it helps to define the nature o f the issues that get pushed onto the agenda o f the public dialogue and since parties discover w hat their deepest disagreem ents or agreements are, only once the process o f public dialogue has run its course. Benhabib (1992:100) notes that struggles to off-set the effects o f pow er differentials in any context begin with a redefinition o f what had previously been considered "private" (such as all matters relating to the household), and therefore not matters o f public concern (i.e. not matters for debate on a public agenda). This flexibility in a society to (re)negotiate the boundary between "private" and "public" cannot be frozen as long as it is permissible to question the rules o f participation in the dialogue. This means that the boundary cannot be redrawn in such a way that it limits the reach o f moral particularity o f civic society into civil society. A consequence o f this is that the boundary cannot prevent privately held values from becoming public shared norms, and therefore that it cannot limit civic autonomy. Indeed, where the boundary is drawn is a matter for negotiation and rests ultimately on consensus.
The picture that emerges here is that o f bourgeois culture and society in which a "procedural type o f legitimacy" becomes the norm in moral and political matters. Haberm as (1979:184-185) says:
T he form al conditions o f ju stificatio n them selves obtain legitim ating force ... the level o f ju stific atio n has becom e reflective and the p rocedures and presuppositions o f ju stific atio n are them selves now the legitim ating grounds on w hich the validity o f legitim ations is based. T he idea o f an agreem ent that com es to pass all parties, as free and equal, determ ines the procedural type o f legitim acy o f m odem tim es.
A gency rights
How did "the procedural type o f legitimacy" manifest itself in society? If Habermas is right, the procedural republic developed in the w ake o f the failure of ontologically grounded justifications (God or nature) and becam e the proper setting o f justification by consensus (Pusey, 1987:194) . Tw o developments in this regard are o f special significance.
• Because society has become culturally pluralistic, it becom es necessary to create scope for differences between individuals and groups which are to be integrated in social structures.
• The resolution o f conflict between culture and social integration takes the form o f a reordering o f social relationships.
The idea o f a fixed, invariant conception o f justice is confined to a public sphere in which the political authority o f the state is limited, and in which relations between individuals are subject to principles secured by rational agreement. Beyond this sphere, individuals are free to pursue their self-chosen ends and goods. This is the civic space referred to above -within it people are free to follow diverse values and interests without having to secure the approval o f others and without having to suffer legal liabilities for their choices.
Central to this conception o f public space lies a conception o f human beings as agents whose agency has cash-value in society because the purpose o f agencysocial integration -is culturally anchored2. The social nature o f our agency determines that we think o f ourselves as social constructions w hose hopes o f a shared, just society can be realized in the promise o f social solidarity which only culture can offer -and this is because the cultural is irreducibly collective. Now, the link between agency and rights is a social given. Indeed, it is a function o f the split between "public" and "private", which created the need for private space in which agents may act autonomously, and the need for state protected space in which an ongoing debate about the basic structure o f society may continue. In this context rights can only be defined with reference to agency. This has a major effect on social integration, but one which enhances the potential for autonomous action. The scope o f the political authority becom es limited to enforcing only those rules or norms which participants in the discursive space accept as rationally binding on all. These rules protect the private and autonomously chosen space o f individuals and groups to pursue their own distinctive ends. Human agency, then, provided a conceptual basis for a system o f rights -in particular, agency rights, because they recognize and create scope for the exercise o f human capacity for agency.
To treat someone as an agent is to treat her in terms o f her capacity for agency. At a minimum this means treating her as one capable o f autonomous choice, or as one capable o f choosing on the basis o f reasons. How autonomous are these reasons? H aberm as's discursive public space is the sociological correlate o f his discourse concept o f legitimacy -it is the arena in which dialogues o f legitimacy take place and legitimacy is confirmed (Benhabib, 1992:103) . Haberm as views this space democratically as the space in which the rules o f participation and procedures are open to reformulation and reinterpretation by those who participate. This space, then, does not stand under the constraints o f neutrality i.e. the rule which govern the dialogue does not pretend to be neutral between competing conceptions o f the good which enter the dialogue, but are rather themselves written in terms o f these conceptions whenever a dialogue takes place (Benhabib, 1992:105) . The public sphere can be any discursive space and comes into existence whenever and wherever parties engage in discourse, evaluating the general social and political norms which govern their society. There may be as many public spaces at any given time as there are debates about the validity of social norms. And these are autonomous public spaces or spheres, making for a plurality o f viewpoints, a fact which greatly encourages the democratization of civil society.
The autonomy o f each space in this plural landscape is substantive and not merely formal. Thus, though the autonomy o f each space is subject to the constraints of a practical discourse in which the criterion o f what counts as a good argument depends heavily on shared meanings and practices that make up the communicative structures o f everyday life, each space may legitimately legislate on substantive nonnative issues. Normative issues include the following consensual generation o f norms in debates which challenge tradition, the development o f individual identities outside conventional role and gender definitions as well as the relevance o f cultural tradition for self-definition. The mentioned cultural tradition for self-definition has been becoming increasingly autonomous i.e. dependent on individuals' reflective and critical abilities rather than on rigid role understanding or the appropriation o f exemplars from history. The main problem in mediating relations between civic and civil society is not so much to persuade rational agents that they should accept the moral constraints of their forum, but rather to create a culture o f discourse to mediate among opposing moral conceptions o f what morality demands o f us. The social significance of this issue -its actual manifestation in society -walks hand in hand with the growth o f appeal to a rational justification for morality3. They are inseparable social phenomena. Creating a culture o f discourse is, for Haberm as, a strategy for creating a morally just political order.
D iscursive public space
According to Habermas discursive spaces do not operate under the procedural constraints o f neutrality. By this is meant that the conversational constraints set by H aberm as's discourse o f legitimation reject the claim that any reason for action can be a good reason if it is maintained that this conception o f the good is better than those advanced by others. For Haberm as the openness (O ffentlichheit) o f discourse cannot be overridden by "morally neutral" constraints about the w ay in which discourse must take place. Accordingly, the only constraints Habermas recognizes are those which arise from practical discourse itself, and these are specified by the shared meanings and practices that make up the communicative structures o f the everyday life-world. These constraints are themselves normative, and take the form o f conditions o f participation rather than criteria o f procedural equality or neutrality. Habermas assumes that at minimum they are conditions o f universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, conditions he believes to be compatible with the democratization o f society, which he sees as a growth in the plurality o f autonomous public (civic) spheres and spaces (Benhabib, 1992:29-31 ). These constraints, he believes, avoid the problems o f elitism and inegalitarianism, working rather for consensus in his vision o f a plurality o f discursive democracies.
The condition o f universal moral respect requires that participants recognize the right o f all beings capable o f speech and action to be party to the moral conversation. The condition o f egalitarian reciprocity requires that every participant in the moral conversation must have the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate speech (i.e. the topics o f conversation), and to request reflection on the presuppositions o f the conversation. The latter, o f course, allows that the rules o f the conversation game can be contested within the game itself, but only insofar as participants accept to abide by the conditions o f participation in playing the game. The rules o f the game no less than their inter pretation are contestable, but contestation does not mean that they can be rewritten in such a w ay that the conditions o f participation are suspended because this would mean that parties to the conversation enter the dialogue without the required "will" to arrive at consensus.
How are these constraints (conditions o f participation) o f the moral conversation justified? Habermas argues that as rules o f fair debate these constraints are "universal-pragmatic" presuppositions (o f fairness) which can be viewed as a set o f procedural rules (Benhabib, 1992:30) . This view, is, o f course, standardly liberalist because it em bodies the moral ideal that w e ought to respect each other as beings whose moral standpoints are deserving equal consideration. This view also implies that w e ought to respect each other as human beings w hose capacity for expressing a standpoint (communicative com petence) w e ought to enhance every time we create a discursive dem ocracy (which is w herever and w henever we create civil or civil discursive spaces). There is no justification for these constraints beyond these considerations. • A moral/political landscape with a plurality o f discursive dem ocracies Is it enough to achieve communicative agreement in autonomous civic societies? Or must such agreement be strictly universalized across civic boundaries, i.e. must the reach or scope o f principle be extended to civil rather than ju st to civic society? It is instructive to note that for Haberm as the conditions o f participation are universalizable in the sense that they become intersubjective procedures of argumentation for all civic groupings (Benhabib, 1992:36-37) . Any principle of action adopted in a civic grouping can, in principle, not conflict with the conditions o f participation, because that would be in conflict with the idea of communicative agreement. Since this idea o f communicative agreement defines a w eak sense o f justification, all principles o f action are strictly subject to weak justification. (A strong justification would require that the status o f H aberm as's conditions as pragm atic universals be dropped.) But within this broad parameter many different agreements are possible. Habermas wishes to retain a moral/ political landscape in which a plurality o f discursive dem ocracies are possible. How is this possible?
• H aberm as's participatory view of public discourse Haberm as takes a participatory view -rather than an integrationist one -o f public discourse because he sees the problem o f modernity as one characterized by a sense o f the loss o f moral and political agency, particularly the efficacy o f agency -rather than a loss o f a sense o f belonging and solidarity (Benhabib, 1992:77) . He thinks that the intersubjective constitution o f the self and o f self identity through communicative interaction are adequately taken care o f within civic groupings (which have non-exclusive principles o f membership). So he rather wishes to stress differentiation between communicative agreements, and the autonomous status o f the discursive spheres within which agreements are reached. Differentiation is, according to Haberm as, a force working for the consensual generation o f norms because it creates the required social bonds within which decisions can be made regarding the distribution o f social goods. This has the significant spin-off that it em powers agents -they create autonomous principles o f social life, gaining thereby a sense o f agency and efficacy. And since they create these principles autonomously -without the threat o f subversion by the civil authority -they are better placed to understand the nature o f the social bond which defines their identity and to comprehend its meaning (what it offers them in terms o f self-understanding). Democratization which allows tradition to be subjected to critique and revision at the level Haberm as thinks is necessary to overcome the alienating conditions o f modernity encapsulates something o f the integrationist view, but at a level which remains sensitive to the local and the historical.
• Differentiation as a focus on justice Haberm as's emphasis on a "participation" understanding o f society raises social differentiation to a high level o f value. In Habermas, differentiation takes the form o f a focus on justice. Judgements o f justice constitute the hard core o f all (deontological) morality (Benhabib, 1992:72) . Because differentiation (and the preservation o f autonomy) is so important, Haberm as believes that significant work in morality can be done only in the realm o f self-other relations, particularly to structure such relations. Indeed, judgem ents o f justice reflect conceptions o f self-other relations. The formation o f self-identity and justice are therefore linked. Judgements concerning the good life fall outside the ambit o f this project because the whole point o f structuring self-other relations is to set agents free (i.e. create private space for them) to pursue their choices. In this latter respect the liberties o f competent communicators cannot be limited or curtailed for the sake o f some specific (substantive) conception o f the social good or welfare. So with respect to judgem ents about the good life, individual rights trump the collective will. But not so with justice. Judgements o f justice are the foundation stone o f the freedom o f civic groupings to reach communicative agreement, and must therefore rest on real/actual discourses (and not hypothetical ones) which take the conditions o f participants -their particularity -as a starting point for their dialogue. This means in effect that justification and contextualization in real situations run together. Only those norms can claim legitimacy that meet -or could m eet -with the real situations o f participants in their capacity as participants in practical discourse.
Habermasian reactionism
Does this project succeed? In particular, does H aberm as's social order em pow er agents in the sense that it restores a sense o f the efficacy o f their agency? And does it encourage the growth o f self-identity? Haberm as constructs a " superstructural" notion o f culture from the idea o f a plurality o f divergent universes o f discourses. But ultimately his concept o f communicative rationality -in particular, the pragmatic universal presuppositions o f public dialogue -appeal to a notion o f cultural unity. This cultural unity requires that all validity claims be redeemable within specific discourses -a culture which also elevates the force o f argument to the final court o f appeal. So, though Haberm as seemingly opts for a participatory approach, his concept o f communicative rationality contains within itself an assimilationist ideal which militates against cultural pluralism and the traditionalism o f civic groupings. This assimilationist ideal is achieved by pro moting a concept o f civil community which is both hom ogeneous and monocultural, and which resists the cultural and ethnic particularity o f civic groupings. It is indeed, whatever potential for this kind o f particularity exists at the civic level, transformed into a single identity at the level o f civil society. Civic community, to have any sense o f coherent identity, is likely to fall victim to the shared order o f being which H aberm as's concept o f communicative rationality engenders.
If all this is correct, the autonomy o f criticism (understood as the contested dialogue) easily falls victim to sponsorship and control by the state. Civic discursive spaces cease to be unconstrained spaces which help to shape struggles over self-definition and identity. Indeed, since difference falls victim to the monoculturalism o f H aberm as's concept o f communicative rationality, it is not difficult to see how easily the multiplicity o f discursive dem ocracies fall prey to assimilation by a reactionary cultural politics.
A d ap ting the culturalism o f liberalism
Difference versus identity
Liberal pluralism, in the version defended by Habermas, attem pts to derive the effectiveness o f discourse as a social critique from a transcendental perspective. This is perhaps the central reason why the critique which communicative rationality generates loses the critical force o f the cultural, and thereby whatever force the notion o f difference could have. Now, one w ay o f bringing about a reconciliation between the professed ideals o f pluralism, and their realization in practice, is through a reformulation o f the liberal tradition. This is what Kymlicka (1989) and Taylor (1995) attempt to accomplish. Kymlicka (1989:162-181) places the cultural and the historical at the centre o f an attempt to rehabilitate notions o f citizenship and community as the basis for a substantive approach to participation in the liberal democracy. There is a sense in which culture is a determ inant o f choice.
• First, decisions about ways o f life are informed by culture in so far as the range o f alternatives is determined by the cultural heritage.
• Second, it is only within a culturally specified range o f options that we decide which roles to adopt and which ones have value for us.
• Third, cultural membership makes these options and our decisions about them meaningful to us.
Taken together, these points suggest that loss o f cultural membership is a fundamental loss which affects our capacity to judge the value o f our life plans.
Culture is, however, not just a determinant o f choice. It is also a determ inant o f identity. One way o f showing a connection between cultural membership and identity is through language. The sociologist, J. Fishman (1972:4) , argues that " language is never simply a neutral medium for identifying the contents o f our activities -rather it itself is content, a reference for loyalties and animosities, a marker o f societal goals, the large-scale value-laden arenas o f interaction that typify every speech community" .
Another way o f showing the connection is through history, especially a history o f oppression. The South African political activist, F. M khwanazi (1985:18), says the following about black oppression and the loss o f a sense o f personal efficacy: "The regime tried to make us believe that our people had no history ... they wanted us to carry an image o f ourselves as pathetic, utterly defeated, dependent, incapable and pow erless" .
Miller (1989) shows that ethnographers and historians have great pow er over oppressed people inasmuch as they can fix an identity for them. A case in point is the creation o f the Pokomo as a "backw ard" group in East Africa. A rigid system o f colonial control over agriculture constrained and disadvantaged this group through the creation o f a "backw ard" identity, and various stereotypes associated with that identity. A similar theme is evident in the work o f the anthropologist Hayt Alverson (1978) . Alverson explores patterns o f dependency between the impoverished rural Tsw ana people o f South Africa and the labour intensive mining economy in which they strove for self-sufficiency. He articulates this striving in terms o f their concept o f "wanting-to-do", and shows that the laying o f plans for life through culturally recognized work is basic to their self identity and that this persisted in the face o f dehumanizing work conditions under the migrant labour system. The African historian, Wunyabari M aloba (1993), examines the psychology o f dispossession as a cause o f the anticolonial M auMau revolt. Dispossession o f land led to a complete disjuncture with M au-M au history, a break with notions o f community as these people understood it, and concomitantly, with their self-identity, which created a trauma about which colonial records have had little to say. All this m akes sense on the assumption that personal agency is tied to a cultural heritage, and that a cultural structure imparts a sense o f self-identity. The upshot is that since our ability to choose and to actualize our humanity can be developed only in a certain kind o f social context we have a duty, and necessarily so, to sustain that context. An empirical fact about the vulnerability o f cultural structures -they are fragile and they can be damaged and even destroyed (see Kymlicka, 1989 :162-181) -com mits us to their preservation.
Contexts o f choice and identity are primary goods in R aw ls's sense i.e. sustaining a cultural structure is as significant in a ju st society as protecting liberties and securing conditions o f equality o f opportunity. K yinlicka's cultural thesis has a significant spin-off which counterbalances the difiference-blindness to which liberalism standardly falls victim. This is why multicultural states need to make provision for differential citizenship rights (group or minority rights) as a necessary premise o f the equal respect people are ow ed as members o f specific cultural communities. Kymlicka's argument (Kymlicka, 1989:38) , which begins with the liberal principle that people are responsible for their choices, though not necessarily for their circumstances, offers as its major premise the view that differences in resources which affect people's choices arise from their circumstances. Unequal circumstances which may inhibit and even penalize participation in the political community constitute an area o f illegitimate inequality. A cultural minority, or even a marginalized culture, is not responsible for the disadvantages it suffers in its attempts to maintain its integrity, if those disadvantages are due to unequal social circumstances. Furthermore, the benefits o f dominance which accrue to a dominant culture comes without cost to its members, but these benefits are beyond the purchase pow er o f minoritized or marginalized individuals; they have to pay to secure whatever is valuable to their cultural heritage, which leaves them with less resources to pursue other cultural projects. Spending their resources on securing mere survival is not a problem which members o f the dominant cultures face -indeed, they get if for free. The minority cultures should then be compensated for their disadvantages by state recognition o f special group rights.
It is not difficult to see that the source o f K ym licka's argument for special rights protecting minority and marginalized cultures from the disintegrating and assimilating effects o f decisions made by people outside these cultures, rests on the context o f identity variant in his argument. A context o f choice can be degraded and difficult to maintain because a context o f identity is threatened. The unequal costs associated with differential social circumstances, which requires additional (state sponsored) resources to give threatened cultures equal life-chances, should then be justified with reference to the considerations of cultural identity. It is worth noting here that K ym licka's major objection to assimilationist policies invokes the identity postulate: " ... cultural membership affects our very sense o f personal identity and capacity ..." (Kymlicka 1989:175) .
The identity postulate contains a revisability criterion. " ... we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life ... [Yet w e must] be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and arguments our culture can provide (Kymlicka, 1989:184) .
The argument that minoritized or marginalized cultural groups will be handicapped with reference to the primary good o f cultural membership by circumstances for which they are not responsible is a variant o f the politics o f difference, but with strong overtones o f an identity politics. (Circum stances which handicap minoritized people and for which they are not responsible should, how ever, as an imperative o f justice, and by special rights, be redressed.)
Against liberal pluralist political practice in South A frica
Referring to South Africa, Kymlicka remarks that justice is not necessarily guaranteed by a system o f plural citizenships and special rights o f the kind he is advocating; an appeal to justice (i.e. special rights) is properly called for only for those communities who find themselves in circumstances o f cultural vulnerability.
The major problem with this appeal is that it is perceived as violating equal protection guarantees. The major political task, then, "is to devise constitutional provisions ... which will be flexible enough to allow for the legitimate claims o f cultural membership, but which are not so flexible as to allow systems o f racial or cultural oppression" (Kymlicka, 1989:255) .
In other words, though identity variants are critical in that they guarantee a recognition o f differences, they must not be so strong that difference is compromised. How this might be practically possible is unsatisfactorily answered by the reusability criterion, for this criterion requires that there should be cultural borders, but does not specify their degree o f interrelationability. For Peters (1995:49) such a state o f indeterminacy is unsatisfactory. "The deconstruction o f the logic o f identity reveals how the binary oppositions generated by it [difference versus identity], in fact, require one another for their assertion. A politics o f difference, by contrast, unfreezes fixed identities, recognizing that they are both relational and contextual" .
A strong emphasis on identity variants in political institutions tend to repress the particularity o f group differences and the heterogeneity o f group experiences because the logic which this em phasis generates produces a political climate favouring conformity -cultural and national. In such a climate interrelationability between groups privileges the growth o f a national culture over differentiated group cultures which might otherw ise co-exist as equals in a form o f political parallelism.
Recognition and identity
Like Habermas, Taylor too is concerned with the efficacy o f agency. Taylor (1994:75) advocates the practice he calls "the politics o f recognition" .
T he dem and for recognition ... is given urgency by the su pposed links betw een recognition and identity. T he thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the m v rec o g n itio n o f others, and so a person o r group o f p eople can suffer real dam age, real d istortion, if the people or society around them m irror back to them a con fin in g or dem eaning or contem ptible pictu re o f them selves.
Taylor's politics o f recognition is intended to serve as a corrective to a blind spot in plural liberalism. This concerns the impact o f pow er differentials on the distribution o f rights. Taylor (1994:81-82) argues that a " discourse o f recognition" has come to mean two things: pluralist liberals tend to forget that the rights in force at any time in the life o f a community have been constituted on the exclusion or subordination o f some category o f the Other (e.g. gender, race, etc.), and that in consequence a historical gap has arisen between persons able to translate their rights into substantive benefits, and those who have not been able to do so. This is a problem in post-apartheid South Africa which has been unsuccessfully addressed in the current "difference-blind" spaces o f our public discourses. The reason for the forgetfulness about historical disadvantage is a consequence o f one-level political thinking which recognizes the equal dignity of all citizens, but which accords everyone little more than a formal recognition of rights and other entitlements.
The second meaning has arisen from the interplay between identity and difference as binary oppositions in liberal pluralism. Though an emphasis on difference recognizes identity and distinctness, liberal pluralism has obliterated significant categories o f difference in the interests o f a (false) monocultural politics, which works on the basis o f the "one-level" thinking just referred to. W hat does it mean to receive equal recognition in the public arena o f political life? Taylor's first line o f thought begins with the idea that all members o f a political community are equally entitled to respect because they are all members o f the human race. This line o f thought is difference-blind in the right sense. The second line o f thought does not reject the ideal o f our entitlement to an equality o f respect (or dignity), but regards this as itself insufficient. This entitlement needs to be amplified by a (public) recognition o f our differences. We are asked to recognize distinct identities, particularly cultural identities, as morally significant categories. T aylor's main argument is that moral identities are formed by recognition. M isrecognition counts as a harm because it deforms identity (women, people o f colour, and even people who prefer to live in stone-age technologies, like the Inuit o f Canada, are victims o f misrecognition). M arginalized groups tend to internalize deformed images o f themselves, making deformity a constitutive part o f their self-expression.
The second line o f thought complements the first, and is seen as a counterweight to the assimilationist tendencies o f the first. The first line o f thought -the line o f equal dignity -champions nondiscrimination and advocates difference-blindness: given any case, no one is entitled to differential treatment unless there are good (publicly defended and accepted) reasons why some particular individual should be treated differently. The second line o f thought -the line o f unique identity argues that in order to attain a political community in which nondiscrimination is the norm, w e need to make distinctions between different cultural communitiesdistinctions which call for differential treatment as morally justified (given the particular history o f disadvantaged communities).
• The line of unique identity The line o f unique identity identifies two main areas in which the recognition o f difference is necessary and differential treatment justified. In some South African communities a great many people have been handicapped by poverty which has reduced their citizen rights to second and even third class status. It does not help to offer these people citizenship rights without social programmes designed to alleviate their poverty and upgrade the status o f their citizenship rights. Inherited poverty traps are difficult to overcome and mark a difference which citizen rights itself cannot eliminate. The mere award o f citizenship rights is difference-blind in the wrong sense in that it perpetuates a social order in which asymmetrical pow er relations between rich and poor remain in force. There is, o f course, a problem with social programmes designed to alleviate the social conditions o f historically disadvantaged groups. Such programmes tend to be assimilationist, i.e. they tend to assimilate disadvantaged groups to the cultural identity o f the communities which dominate the political life o f the society at large, a fact which tends to reinforce the " inferior" status o f the disadvantaged cultures. The politically dominant or hegemonic culture assim ilates the particularity o f the disadvantaged cultures into a homogeneous mould. In so far as the disadvantaged groups take on an alien form, they lose their particular identities. Their identities are suppressed, and this itself is highly discriminatory and inegalitarian.
Taylor, however, believes that equal recognition will resist this kind o f marginalization. For instance, the hegemonic success o f the w hite culture in South Africa was mainly due to the fact that values deriving from the cultural capital o f the white culture were falsely presented as universal values. Prior to the demise o f apartheid the allegedly universalist status o f white values w as used as a divisive tool separating white and black and securing political pow er for the white culture. It is important to note that white values are em bedded in white cultures and as such they are particularities, though they have m asqueraded as universally valid. There is in this falsehood a lesson to be leam t from the post apartheid era. The difference-blind value structures which have gained pride o f place in the current political life o f South Africa also claim to be universalist in so far as our capacity for moral action is recognized as a capacity all human beings share. It is thus in virtue o f this capacity that all human beings are regarded as deserving equal respect and dignity. This is the right sense o f the difference-blind values mentioned above. But w e must take care that the wrong sense o f difference-blind values do not override the right sense, i.e. do not override the values o f particularity, particularly those values associated with our need to be recognized for who we are and where w e come from. This capacity for defining one's own identity as one constituted by the identity o f on e's cultural community must likewise be respected equally in everyone. In this respect it is not enough to recognize that we all have the same potential for moral action; w e must also guard against the idea that some cultures are more valuable than others, for in entertaining this possibility we deny human equality.
A politics o f equal recognition -such as the one being defended here -will be one hospitable to difference because o f the following reasons:
-Such a politics does not only insist on uniform entitlements (rights to liberty, freedom from unlawful arrest, equality before the law etc.), but also looks at the worth o f these entitlements, particularly for historically disadvantaged communities.
-A politics o f equal recognition takes the collective goals o f cultural communities seriously, which means recognizing cultural differences and making space in the public (political) forum for these differences in the attempt to construct a common political identity.
R adical dem ocracy: a critique
M ouffe's parallelism
M ouffe (1992) characterizes parallelism as a kind o f political association that can be "enjoyed among relative strangers belonging to many purposive associations [civic communities] and whose allegiances to specific communities is not seen as conflicting with their membership in the civil association" (M ouffe, 1992:233) .
This civil association is modelled on O akesholt's republica, a "practice o f civility ... specifying not performances, but conditions to be subscribed to in choosing perform ances (M ouffe, 1992:232) .
Since this form o f political association admits a multiplicity o f substantive ideas o f the common good -embodied in specific civic associations -the conditions at issue here take the form o f a "complex o f rules" (M ouffe, 1992:32) , and identification which encourages the idea o f a common bond (rather than a common good) as the ground o f a common political identity. M ouffe (1992:235) characterizes this common identity, which is the basis o f citizenship, as an "articulating principle" making possible the "different subject positions" o f the agent (i.e. different social relations engendered by such categories as gender, class, race, ethnicity, culture etc.) and holding "civic" and "civil" in a state o f balance. Civic associations are "private", and the practices and rules o f civility are "public", but the two identities o f the "decentred" subject "exist in a permanent tension that can never be reconciled" (M ouffe, 1992:238) .
This impossibility is the baseline o f M ouffe's argument for a genuine parallelism. A multicultural parallelism would require a different conception o f the subjectone which stresses the constitutive role o f a multiplicity o f subject positions and a multiplicity o f social identities. To the extent that such a decentred subject displaces a unitary subject, to that extent the homogeneous unity o f national culture would be unable to subvert the identity o f different cultural groups (Mouffe, 1992:233) . And it is not difficult to see why, for the decentred subject difference is no longer a deficiency or threat and so cannot serve as the basis o f cultural oppression or domination -provided, o f course, that a genuine parallelism holds sway.
M ouffe's "decentred" self remains effacious in her agency in two ways: the possibility o f her agency in one sphere o f social life cannot be diminished by her position in another sphere, and membership o f the various spheres cannot become mutually exclusive. Two things hold the argument in place: The idea o f a decentred self, an "ensemble o f subject positions" constructed in the " discursive surfaces" (Mouffe, 1992:237) o f public dialogue, and the idea that civic and civil identities -conceptualized as "forms o f identification" (M ouffe, 1992:237) -resist each other, and therefore create a space for a contested dialogue. Within this dialogue questions about identity and difference can be raised without fear o f compromise, without fear o f collapsing into binary oppositions on a single scale o f assimilation.
These ideas create an interesting point o f interaction between Goldberg, M ouffe, Kymlicka and Taylor, in opposition to H aberm as's homogenization o f culture and politics. Kymlicka's concern with a cultural context as moral category, and Taylor's concern with egalitarian relations between such contexts -based on the humanistic assumption that all cultures have "something important to say to all human beings" (Taylor, 1994:98) -complement M ouffe's efforts at dispelling the idea o f a binary opposition between difference and identity. A civil space which can accommodate both identity and difference, again, is a space in which G oldberg's "com parative contextualization" would generate the critical tools needed to sustain values like egalitarian reciprocity, mutual respect and the recognition o f difference.
Do the critics o f the monoculturalism o f modernity sketch a viable alternative? The outstanding feature o f K ymlicka's work is the importance he attaches to the condition o f constitutiveness. Community is constitutive o f the contexts in which choice and identity are nurtured, and this is a good reason for any community to claim the right for the protection o f its (collective) cultural identity. The cultural spaces Kymlicka creates in his tapestry o f a multicultural politics are (to some unspecified degree) interrelational; they do not freeze or fix identities but rather attempt to contextualize the process o f identity formation within and between cultural spaces, in the way M ouffe's views require. Recognition (affirmation) o f identity-in-difference -in the sense Taylor requires -which gives to both identity and difference their dues, refrains from forcing membership o f any particular group on anyone. This too overlaps with Mouffe. Though Taylor sees community as constitutive o f identity, interrelationability prevents membership from becoming a limitation on individuals' autonomy. The former South African homelands policy bears witness to the consequences o f misrecognition and forced or fixed group membership. Taylor's plea for equal recognition (and equal worth o f citizenship) is in line with Kymlicka's recommendations, which are flexible enough to allow systems o f cultural membership, but not so flexible as to allow oppression.
T aylor's theme also interacts with M ouffe's concerns. Neglecting differences by focusing too sharply on "equality" leads to assimilation and the loss o f the specific identities o f communities. Accentuating the specific characteristics of different communities, however, leads to the exaltation o f collective identities and the signalization o f others as com pletely Other, i.e. as persons whose cultures are in principle inaccessible. Mouffe (1992:225-239) argues that, given the treatment o f " identity" and "difference" as binary opposites a focus on differential treat ments and the appropriate social measures that might be implemented as an expression o f newly discovered sensitivity to differences, may have the opposite o f the intended outcomes viz. assimilation, marginalization and minoritizing. In multicultural societies such outcomes are invited by the identity variant present in the appeal to a collective identity -the equalizing force o f the difference-blind values o f liberal pluralism which transforms multiplicity into a new uniformity. For Mouffe the most effective counter lies in a reconceptualization o f the subject -her idea o f "decentred" subject capable o f occupying different subject positions. This idea implies a notion o f social cohesion quite different from that defended by Habermas. But, since Mouffe does not work this out in any detail, I tum to Ryan (1989) to show what M ouffe's views might entail.
Ryan's hypothesis for a post-revolutionary society
In H aberm as a unitary culture is premised on the separation o f questions o f justice (and rights) from questions about the good life, which is a function o f the separation o f the public and private spheres. Judgements about justice fall within the ambit o f the public sphere and are subject to the validating norms o f public discourse. Judgements about the good life pertain to the private sphere, and are not open to regulation or interference by the civil authorities. This draw s an " inside"/" outside" (" interior"/"exterior") boundary in the psyche o f the subject, and in society, but one which allows the public sphere to colonize the private sphere through the validating norms o f public discourse.
Ryan takes issues with these dichotomies on several counts, but his most pertinent criticism focuses on liberalism's understanding o f equality as a formal principle o f equal treatment. Briefly, Ryan argues that the liberal ideal o f equality is merely a form o f juridical equality, which is a consequence o f the "public-private" distinction. This ideal arises from liberalism principles o f rational justice which are developed apart from the "actual material situation o f the social w orld" (Ryan, 1987:168) . The consequences o f this, as Ryan (1987:168) points out, are unjust.
The ideal o f equal treatm ent then becom es a m eans o f ju stify in g the existence o f that particular social situation. If all are treated equally by the law, then the em pirical specificities o f social in equality can be m ade to seem legitim ate. T hey are the result o f fair play regulated by fa ir rules or principles. In this schem e, then, the rational principle o f eq u ality is the cause o f law, and social inequality, ra th e r than being seen as the cause that calls forth the principle o f equal treatm ent as a response, com es to be seen as the secondary effect, an accidental resu lt o f e ssen tially fair rules.
The liberal principle o f equality o f treatment is then not a foundation principle o f liberal society, but rather the product o f inequality in liberal society -inequality which itself is a function o f the "public-private" dichotomy. If this is so, it cannot be assumed that a boundary o f the kind in question can be drawn in the same way in all cultures. So if one is to construct a public dialogue around G oldberg's idea o f "comparative contextualization", it needs to be borne in mind that w here a boundary is drawn is a function o f native subjectivity.
As indicated above, the way Haberm as draw s the distinction between private and public in the psyche o f the subject, subjects the " interior" realm -the domain o f relations o f free association -to the "exterior" realm -the domain o f normed public discourse. According to Ryan (1987:20) this intrusion is due to H aberm as's view that the labour process is part o f the "rational realities o f capitalism" (and thus part o f the overall project o f the rationalization o f society), and to the fact that a system like money has not lost its class specificity, thus sustaining a "self-reproducing class system " (Ryan, 1987:29) . Ultimately the problem is due to the fact that a doctrine o f rights is w elded to an individualist model o f the social good in which the right to personhood grew up historically in conjunction with the right to property (Ryan, 1987:152) . It is not difficult to see what the project o f modernity in its liberal pluralist form has in store for South Africa. Money and its concomitant social pow er differentiations, translated into political power, elevated a white intelligentsia to the status o f m anagers o f a capitalist economic system which requires labour exploitation as a necessary and rational feature o f its operations. Though this situation w as particularly evident during the apartheid era, it grew up during the era o f colonialism. It is the problem affirmative action policies are unsuccessfully attem pting to grapple with -unsuccessful because, if Ryan is right -m odernity's attem pts to address the social problems which have developed in the w ake o f differential patterns o f distribution tend to assimilate difference and marginalize historical identities. This is a source o f serious social tension. Ryan advocates a reconceptualization o f liberalism's principles o f liberty and equality. M ouffe's "decentred s e lf', and Ryan's "complex o f differential boundary relations", tie selfhood to the external social world in such a way that a dem arcation between "interior" and "exterior" becomes impossible. There is no space for a non-relational self, and by implication, no space for non-relational action in civic or civil society. The self, then, ceases to be an owner for whom rights are property. The formal right to equal treatment, for instance, becomes inseparable from its institutional context and the " interrelational character of social w ealth" (Ryan, 1987:117) and hence inseparable from material equality. So the doctrine o f rights become a doctrine o f "exercisable rights" (Ryan, 1987:162) . Two consequences o f socio-psychological significance follow. The first is that the white professionals' right to own large quantities o f property -a right gained in a context in which white economic pow er diminished participation by blacks -becom es the subject o f social critique: in M ouffe's (1992:236) words their "existing rights have been constituted on the very exclusion or subordination o f the rights o f other categories", and are therefore open to radical reinterpretation. The second is that, to the extent black youths are able to claim more exercisable rights, to that extent their identity would cease to be abridged in com parison with their white counterparts.
W hat might we gain from G oldberg's "comparative contextualization"?
There is no doubt that new identities are required (reconstitution o f historical identities?). Mouffe favours a "common political identity" as "radical democratic citizens" (M ouffe, 1992:236) • There is also no doubt that new institutional structures are required. Social relations in which relations o f domination prevail must be challenged if the principles o f liberty and equality are to be reconceptualized and their import rewritten. W hat is needed here is a conception o f "dem ocratic equivalence" (M ouffe, 1992:236) , a conception o f citizenship focused on a common identification with reinterpreted principles o f liberty and equality -and one allowing the construction o f a "w e" (M ouffe, 1992:230) from our diversity, which leaves difference intact.
• There is no doubt that the political and moral force o f culture should be recognized and given pride o f place in the dem ocratic culture o f the new South Africa.
